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INQUIRIES PERMITTED RE INSURANCE
COMPANIES ON VOIR DIRE
JOHN W. LOW
of the Denver Bar*

"Are you a stockholder, director, employee, policyholder, or in
any manner interested, in any insurance company issuing policies
for protection against liability for damages for injuries to persons or property?" As a defense attorney, would you object to
this question if it were propounded in a negligence case by counsel
for plaintiff on voir dire examination in Colorado?
Although evidence that the defendant is insured against liability is inadmissible because it is irrelevant and prejudicial,
most jurisdictions permit a question in one form or another to be
put to jurymen on their voir dire examination.' The exact form
of the question varies jurisdiction by jurisdiction, trial by trial.
Nevertheless, the commonly used interrogation can be classified
into two groups: One group includes the questions which name
the insurance company, frequently called the specific or narrow
question; the other is illustrated by the question stated above.
This is known as the broad or general interrogation. On numerous
occasions the Supreme Court of Colorado has approved the use
of the specific question.2 Little, if anything, has been said about
the propriety of the general query. Because of this and the divergent views expressed in other jurisdictions, we are confronted with
these issues: Should counsel on voir dire examination be permitted to ask the jury if any of them have any interest in any insurance company? If so, do the Colorado cases prohibit the use
of the broad question?
The answer to the first should be in the affirmative. It is fundamental that every litigant is entitled to a trial before a fair and
impartial jury. To attain this end counsel is entitled as a matter
of right to challenge for cause where the relationship or pecuniary
interest is not substantially remote. Even if such interest will not
operate to disqualify for cause, counsel may desire to make it a
basis for peremptory challenge. In order to exercise intelligently
these rights he must be given considerable latitude in the selection
of a jury. And only by permitting the broad question can the
plaintiff be assured that the jury is disinterested.
Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
see cases collected in 56 A.L.R. 1456 and 104 A.L.R. 1067.
The Vindicator Consolidated Gold Mining Co. v. Firstbrook, 36 Colo. 498, 86 P.
313 (1906); Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. Brabant, 37 Colo. 431, 87 P. 796 (1906);
Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Kalkman, 61 Colo. 98, 156 P. 135 (1916) ; Tatarsky
v. Smith, 78 Colo. 491, 242 P. 971 (1926); Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 226 P. 26
(1928) ; Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 42 P. 2d 740 (1935) ; Johns v. Shinall, 103 Colo.
381, 86 P. 2d 605 (1939).
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Where the interrogation is limited to a named insurance company, the possible bias, interest, or prejudice of a juryman is not
disclosed. The very nature of his employment, past or present,
may create in his mind a prejudice in favor of the defendant. This
can best be shown by a hypothetical illustration.
One of the prospective jurors might be an officer, agent or
employee of an insurance company other than the one involved
in the case, which we assume to be a negligence action based upon
an automobile collision. Such a juror would be the first to suspect
that an insurance company was involved, and it is not unrealistic
to presume that he would lean toward the field of business that
gives him his livelihood. Even if he believed that no indemnity
company was interested in the outcome, his profession would make
him defensive minded. A major stockholder in "another" insurance company, or people more or less indirectly associated with the
insurance field might be anything but impartial jurymen. Yet,
the specific question would not disclose their state of mind nor
develop their possible interests and prejudices.
This conclusion is sustained by an Arkansas case 3 in which
counsel asked both the narrow and broad question. Defendant
then offered to show that "none of this jury is connected with the
general agency or any local agency," and that none of the jurors
had any interest in the company as stockholders. The questions
were propounded over defendant's objections and exceptions. The
court in allowing the questions said:
The jurors or some of them might have had some relationship
or connection with the particular company mentioned or some other
surety company so as to make them undesirable jurors, and still
not have been connected with any agency or held any stock in the
particular company.

Such factors as employment or relationship probably would
not warrant a challenge for cause, but they would aid counsel in
the wise and intelligent exercise of his peremptory challenge.
USE OF THE GENERAL QUESTION

In many jurisdictions counsel is permitted to use the general
question in examining the jurors on their voir dire. 4 One court
has stated that :5
The great weight of authority and the better reasoning alike sanction the view that counsel for plaintiff is entitled in good faith to inquire whether any juror is interested in or connected with any
insurance or casualty company that may be interested in the case as
an insurer of the defendant's liability.
8Halbrook
.Arkansas.

v. Williams, 185 Ark. 885, 50 S. W. 2d 243 (1982).
California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, New York

Ohio, and Wyoming.
'Eagan v. O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 505, 21 P. 2d 821 (1933).

(by statute),
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An Iowa court, in holding that it was permissible to ask the
broad question, pointed out that 27 states have sustained plaintiff's
right to propound an inquiry "such as was propounded in the instant case." ' 6 This figure may be an overstatement of approval,
for many courts in analyzing the propriety of insurance questions
on voir dire examination have failed to consider accurately the
scope of permissive questions. All too frequently the support for
one form of question is found in cases that deal with the other type
of inquiry. Nevertheless, the general question has been approved
on numerous occasions. 7 In at least one instance where counsel objected to the general insurance interrogation for the reason that it
did not relate to any spedific insurance company, it has been held
that the trial court was correct in overruling the objection.8 In
Colorado the door has been left open and, as we shall see, the cases
do not prohibit the use of the general question.
THE SPECIFIC QUESTION PERMITTED IN COLORADO

One of the earliest Colorado cases to consider the propriety of
insurance questions on voir dire examination was The Vindicator
Consolidated Gold Mining Company v. Firstbrook.9 Here plaintiff's interrogation named the insurance company. The trial court
permitted the question over the defendant's objection. In sustaining this action, the Supreme Court said:
* , . but where in this instance, the inquiry of the jurors was
limited to their interest in the insurance company named, and nothing more, it was not error to allow such inquiry. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Jones, 21 Colo. 341;Swift & Co. v. Platte, 72 P. (Kan.) 271.

On the surface it might appear that the court was limiting the
scope of the question to a named insurance company, but the Kansas case cited as authority indicates that the court's intention was
merely to prevent the use of questions which would disclose to the
jury that an insurance company was involved.
In the next two cases to consider the insurance question,10
counsel objected to the interrogations, which named the insurance
companies, on the ground that they constituted prejudicial error.
The right to ask the questions was sustained, the court saying in the
Independence case: 11
It must be remembered that these questions were submitted on
the jurors' voir dire during which considerable latitude must, of
'Rains v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 239 N. W. 36 (1931).
Halbrook v. Williams, supra, note 3; Shaddy v. Daley, 50 Idaho 536, 76 P. 2d
279 (1938) ; Ft. Wayne Checker Cab Co. v. Davis. 90 Ind. App. 30, 165 N. E. 764
(1929); Rains v. Wilson, supra, note 6; Tissue v. Durin, 216 Iowa 709, 246 N. W.

806 (1933); Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 200 N. E. 762 (1936)
Eagan v. O'Malley, supra, note 5.
8Swanson v. Slagal, 212 Ind. 394, 8 N. E. 2d 993 (1937).
'36 Colo. 498, 86 P. 313 (1906).
10Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. Brabant, supra, note 2 ; Independence Coffee & Spice
Co. v. Kalkman, supra, note 2.
11Ibid.
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necessity, be allowed for the purpose of exercising peremptory chalenges.

Both cases cited the Vindicator 12 opinion as authority for the
stated ruling. It should be noted that in none of these cases was
the court called to rule squarely upon the permissive scope of insurance inquiries; in each instance it merely approved the question
asked.
Tatarsky v. Smith 13 adds little to our quest. It sustained the
right to ask the specific question, holding that such an inquiry did
not necessarily convey to the jury the fact that an insurance company was involved in the litigation. As a matter of dictum; the
court stated that counsel could ask such questions as he propounded
even though he had been supplied with names, addresses, ages,
occupations, and residences of each man in the box.
14
In 1928 the court again considered the insurance question.
The case does not clearly indicate whether this'issue was assigned
as error, but the court said:
The plaintiff's counsel was permitted to ask the jury on voir
dire whether any of them were interested in a certain insurance
company. This was proper. The plaintiff had a right to ascertain
the fact as to their interest. True, counsel may have had a desire
to let the jury know that the defendants carried liability insurance,
but we do not see how he or the Court could have treated the matter
more fairly. All argument was in chambers and the court restricted
the examination on this point to the one simple question. (citing
the four Colorado cases that we have just considered).

Note that court does not say that the inquiry should be limited to
this one question, nor does it indicate to what extent one may go
beyond this question.
AUTHORITY FOR USE OF GENERAL QUERY?

Rains v. Rains15 is frequently cited as authority for the proposition that the insurance query may be put to the jury on their
voir dire examination. Here counsel not only asked the specific
question, but also whether the jury knew of companies that indemnify against accidents, and stated that the Globe Indemnity
Company engaged in that kind of business. It was argued that
the jury was advised by these questions that an insurance company
was involved in the defence and that the court's refusal to grant a
mistrial was error. After pointing out that the objections to the
interrogations were not made in time and that the defendant had
waived the right to have a mistrial declared, the court said that
even if the questions were improper, "the permissible question
conveyed, by necessary inference, to every intelligent juror the inVindicator Consolidatel Gold Mining Co. v. Firstbrook, supra, note 2.
"Supra, note 2.
14 Bolles v. Kinton, supra, note 2.
maSupra, note 2.
12
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formation conveyed by the questions objected to." Once again,
then, the problem of scope was not answered.
In the first of the two most recent cases to discuss the propriety
of insurance questions on the voir dire examination, 16 the alleged
error was an unsolicited statement by a witness that an insurance
agent had paid him a visit. Because the insurance element had
not been injected intentionally, the court ruled that it was to be
treated as evidence ordinarily inadmissible. Thus, there was no
reversible error. The dicta in the case, however, is worth noting:
It is permissable to interrogate prospective jurors, some of
whom may be selected to serve in the case, as to their connection
with or interest in insurance companies, and we have held that
questions touching this matter may be asked of every prospective
juror.
It is permissible, and rightly so, that each of twelve prospective
jurors in a case be asked on voir dire examination whether he is a
stockholder, agent, or employee of an insurance company.

Read alone, these statements do not appear to be as narrow as
some of those found in the earlier cases. The terms "certain" and
"named" insurance companies are notably absent, and in the first
paragraph reference to insurance companies is in the plural. While
little weight can or should be given to these remarks, they may
be significant in view of the latest case to come before the court.
GENERAL QUERY PERMITTED IN MALPRACTICE SUIT

Edwards v. Quakenbush 17 was decided in 1944. It was an
action against a physician and surgeon for damages allegedly resulting from his negligence in performing a surgical operation.
In the course of the voir dire examination counsel for plaintiff
asked: "Have any of you gentlemen ever been an officer or employee of a company that insures against malpractice?" A motion
for mistrial was interposed, and overruled. Error was specified to
this ruling. Counsel conceded that it was not error to ask the
insurance question where it named the company, but it is argued
that the right to so inquire does not permit asking a blanket question concerning all insurance companies. The court held:
Whatever may be the proper procedure hypothetically, we are
satisfied that in the instant case the court committed no error in the
ruling made because of the circumstances developed in the hearing
in chambers.

Counsel for plaintiff had asked defendant in chambers for the
name of the company involved. He was denied any information,
and the court allowed the general question to stand upon the express
basis that "Certainly if he (plaintiff's counsel) does not know the
name of the company and cannot find it out, he is entitled to ask
the general question." Although this case does not expressly hold
"Johns v. Shinall, 8upra, note 2.
,, 112 Colo. 337, 149 P. 2d 809 (1944).
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that the general question may be asked, it certainly opens the door
in that direction. The court seemed to be careful not to limit the
inquiry to a named insurance company.
It was deemed important to consider in some detail all of the
Colorado cases' 8 for two reasons: One, so that the reader might
see the trend of the language used by the court, i.e., the fact that
it is less rigid in the recent cases; two, so that it could be shown
that at no time has the court ruled squarely on the permissive scope
of insurance questions-at no time has it declared that the interrogation must be limited to one which names the insurance company.
Concluding that the use of the general question is necessary
in order to obtain for the plaintiff a disinterested jury and that
such an inquiry is not prohibited in Colorado, we then raise one
more question: Should the general interrogation be used exclusively ?
THE GENERAL QUESTION FAIRER FOR BOTH PARTIES

The defendant, like the plaintiff, is also entitled to an impartial jury. It is generally conceded that whenever jurors know that
an insurance company will have to pay, such knowledge will usually
be reflected in a larger recovery and sometimes in a verdict not
consistent with the evidence. Thus, the defendant has a right to
insist that matters of insurance be kept from the jury. Even
though this may be difficult to do, it does not justify the court in
permitting questions which admittedly inform the jury that an insurance company is interested in the outcome. In the Rains case19
the court stated:
A question put to a prospective juror as to whether he has any
interest in or connection with a certain indemnity company would
convey to the mind of every intelligent juror the knowledge that
an indemnity company was interested financially in the outcome of
the litigation....

Where a specific insurance company is named in the inquiry,
a jury will more readily get the impression that an insurance organization is behind the defendant than when counsel used the
general interrogation. As one Justice so aptly said in referring to
a juryman, "He doesn't require a brick house to fall on him to
give him an idea."'20 Because of its very nature. the general question makes the insurance issue less noticeable to the jury. At least
one court
has stated that it would be better not to name the com21
pany.
Another jurisdiction has adopted the rule that the specific
18Potts v. Bird, 93 Colo. 547, 27 P. 2d 745 (1933),
and Phelps v. Loustalet, 91
Col. 350, 14 P. 2d 1011 (1932) also discuss some incidental aspects of the insurance
question.
19Rains v. Rains, supra, note 2.
"Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 21 N. W. 2d 311 (1946).
2Harker
v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187, 236 N. W. 222 (1931).
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question may be asked only if there has been an affirmative answer
to the general interrogation.2 2 This may be the answer to the
problem of the permissive scope of insurance questions. Certainly, the narrow question is not justffied where the jurymen
answer a general inquiry in the negative.
Almost from the beginning the court has said that the matter
of examination on voir dire is largely in the discretion of the trial
court.2 3 This is the rule in most jurisdictions. But the time has
come in Colorado for the Supreme Court to consider thoroughly
the advisability of the practices permitted by the trial courts in
regard to the insurance inquiries. A ruling prohibiting the specific
question or limiting it as in the answer suggested above, would go
far to assure for both the plaintiff and the defendant a fair and
impartial trial.

OIL AND GAS LAW SUBJECT OF ANNUAL
LAW DAY EXERCISES
The annual Law Day exercises at the University of Colorado
this year will be devoted to a two-day conference on oil and gas
law on Friday and Saturday, May 4 and 5, at Boulder.
Dean Edward C. King and his able assistants have assembled
their usual fine array of talent to discuss a field of law which is
still new to Colorado. The following is a summary of the program:
Friday, May 4
9:00 a.m.-Registration at the law school.
10:00 a.m.-Convocation on "The Oil and Gas Industry" by Ernest
0. Thompson, Chairman of the Texas Railway Commission.
11:00 a.m.-A panel discussion on "Taxation of Oil and Gas Interests," with John H. Tippit giving a paper on "Ad
Valorem Taxes," and Floyd K. Haskell delivering a
paper on "Income Taxes." President Robert L. Stearns
will preside at the morning session.
After a luncheon recess, a panel discussion will be held on
"Unitization and Conservation Techniques."
The participants will be James D. Voorhees, attorney with
the Continental Oil, speaking on "The Mechanics of Unitization,"
Robert Hardwicke, attorney of Fort Worth, Texas, speaking on
"Voluntary and Compulsory State Unitization. Statutes," and
Warwick M. Downing, Denver attorney and Colorado representative to the Interstate Oil Compact Commission on "The Interstate
Oil Compact as an Impetus to a Sound Conservation Policy."
22

23

Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, supra, note 7.
Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Jones, 21 Colo. 341

(1895).

